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The practical construction of an ambiguous regulation by an
agency charged with its administration or enforcement is ordinarily ac-
corded great weight in determining its meaning.' Courts reviewing ad-
ministrative actions frequently begin their analysis of a disputed
question of construction by assuming that the agency's interpretation of
the regulation is correct and then deciding whether other factors out-
weigh the agency's view.2
In developing criteria for assigning the proper weight to be ac-
corded an agency's construction, courts have found agency enforce-
ment actions which are contemporaneous with the adoption of the
regulation to be of particular interpretive value Such "contemporane-
ous constructions" provide relevant and instructional information in
discerning the intent, purpose, and meaning of a disputed regulation.
* The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not represent the opinions
or policies of the Department of Energy.
** Attorney, Department of Energy; B.A., Brown University; M.A., University of Sussex,
Falmer, England; J.D., University of Oklahoma.
1. E.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v.
Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1946); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1941). See also Uni-
versal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 (1930). Deference to the agency's interpreta-
tion is not an inviolable rule. The weight to be given any administrative interpretation "will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis-
tency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
2. See Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933):
True indeed it is that administrative practice does not avail to overcome a statute so
plain in its commands as to leave nothing for construction. True it also is that adminis-
trative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be overturned except for
very cogent reasons if the scope of the command is indefinite and doubtful.
.d. at 315 (citations omitted).
3. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT, §§ 11.01-.14 (3d ed. 1972).
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Therefore, such information is frequently the subject of discovery
requests.
This article will examine the circumstances and conditions which
result in a reviewing court's authorizing contemporaneous construction
discovery. Included in the examination will be a discussion of the re-
cent expansion of this discovery procedure to include the statements
and records of lower level agency employees generated in the course of
their day to day application of the disputed regulation.4 This last de-
velopment represents a significant modification of the contemporane-
ous construction doctrine.
II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCOVERY
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit "discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending action."5 Similarly, under the federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA), "oral or documentary evidence may be
received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the ex-
clusion of irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence."6 In
the administrative setting, establishing the relevance and materiality of
evidentiary matter is not, in itself, sufficient to justify the granting of a
discovery request. Discovery procedures also require the moving party
to show that such discovery is necessary or essential to the effective
resolution of the matter before the court. A corollary to this require-
ment is that the information sought must be unavailable except through
the discovery process.'
Judicial review is generally limited to the existing administrative
record. Moreover, discovery requests concerning the meaning of a reg-
ulation are not granted in the absence of allegations of ambiguity in the
regulation, bad faith in the promulgation of the regulation, or silence
within the administrative record.' Under the appropriate circum-
4. For a discussion of the factors underlying this development, see Standard Oil Co. v.
DOE, 596 F.2d 1029, 1052-56 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
6. Administrative Procedure Act § 556(d), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
7. These requirements are commonly set out in an agency's procedural regulations. For
example, the Administrative Procedures and Sanctions of the Department of Energy (DOE) re-
quire that prior to the taking of the testimony of any witness in the proceedings the moving party
must file a document stating "the reasons why the testimony of the witness is necessary" and "the
reasons why the asserted position can be effectively established only through the direct question-
ing of witnesses." 10 C.F.R. § 205.199(b)(2), (3) (1981).
8. Atlantic Richfield Co. [1980 Transfer Binder] ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) % 82,521, at 85,056
(1980).
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stances, however, courts will permit discovery of documents and state-
ments which are not a part of the official record. In these instances,
interpretation by agency officials of the meaning of a regulation or rul-
ing is often recognized as an appropriate discovery issue.
Although an agency's interpretation is not binding on the courts, it
does "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."9 The doctrine
of contemporaneous construction is based upon the principle that great
deference is to be granted to the interpretation of rules and regulations
by the agency charged with their enforcement. This position reflects
the distinction made by reviewing courts between the legal and factual
elements of a particular case. While courts retain authority for a full
inquiry into questions of law, inquiries into the application of the law
to specific factual circumstances are restricted.' 0 Such a limited scope
of review reflects recognition of administrative expertise and the value
of such knowledge in the practical construction of statutory terms. This
judicial deference to administrative interpretations was illustrated in
Udall v. Tallman:11
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this
Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the
statute by the officers or agency charged with its administra-
tion. "To sustain the Commission's application of this statu-
tory term, we need not find that its construction is the only
reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have
reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial
proceedings".2
In deferring to agency interpretations, reviewing courts have ob-
served that such interpretations are often based on more specialized
experience, broader investigation, and more information than a judge
normally possesses in a given case.13 The persuasiveness of an agency's
interpretation may be especially significant where the disputed regula-
tions involve a high degree of specialization, have had long-standing
effectiveness, or were already in existence at the time of statutory
reenactment. 14
9. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
10. See note 3 supra, §§ 30.01-.07, for a discussion of the reasons underlying the law-fact
distinction.
11. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
12. Id. at 16 (quoting Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946)).
13. 323 U.S. at 139 (1944).
14. Allen M. Campbell Co. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261,
[Vol. 17:448
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A. Applicability of the Doctrine
Contemporaneous construction of an agency regulation has gener-
ally been authorized under two conditions. First, where the language
of the disputed regulation is subject to two reasonable interpretations,
and the agency has not given a more definite meaning in its official
pronouncements on the matter; and second, to determine the degree of
deference which a particular interpretation should be afforded where
the agency has issued conflicting pronouncements concerning the
meaning of the disputed regulation.1
5
The first situation is exemplified by Standard Oil Co. v. DOE. 16 In
this case, the Department of Energy (DOE) had issued an interpreta-
tion which stated that even though no regulation had so specified, the
regulations implicitly prohibited the proportional cost recovery se-
quence utilized by Standard Oil in calculating the maximum legal price
at which it could sell its petroleum products. Although conceding that
the regulations promulgated by its predecessor, the Federal Energy Ad-
ministration (FEA),17 did not explicitly provide for a particular se-
quence for the recovery of the various categories of costs incurred in
the refining process, DOE claimed that the regulatory scheme com-
pelled that non-product or operating costs be recouped only after the
recovery of all production acquisition costs.'" In April 1976, FEA had
revoked this non-product cost requirement retroactively to February 1,
1976, but DOE insisted 9 that such a recovery sequence remained ap-
265 (5th Cir. 1971). In this case, the court refused to substitute its judgment for that of the Small
Business Administration in interpreting a highly technical regulation despite the fact that there
appeared to be a more reasonable position than that taken by the agency. See also Philbeck v.
Timmers Chevrolet Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1974). The court took a similar position in
this case involving a Federal Reserve Board interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1691 (1976).
15. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Tenneco v. DOE,
475 F. Supp. 299 (D. Del. 1979).
16. 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
17. FEA became part of the Department of Energy on October 1, 1977. 42 U.S.C. § 7151(a)
(Supp. I 1977). To avoid confusion, it is important to note that while DOE was the agency advo-
cate in this case, FEA actually promulgated the disputed regulations, and it was the interpretation
by FEA employees of the regulations that was the subject of discovery.
18. Under DOE regulations, non-product costs represent those manufacturing costs not asso-
dated with the actual cost of purchasing crude petroleum, such as refinery maintenance, deprecia-
tion, and refinery operation costs. See 10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c) (1981) for definitions of essential
terms utilized in DOE regulatory schemes.
19. 596 F.2d at 1052. This distinction was significant because under DOE pricing regulations
refiners were initially prohibited from banking unclaimed non-product costs for use in support
prices in later sales. In determining maximum legal sales prices under the non-product cost last
recovery sequence, non-product costs could only be claimed after all product costs. Accordingly,
if the sales price of a particular product was below the maximum legal sales price, then it would be
4
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plicable to prior periods.20 Because there was no regulatory provision
that addressed cost recovery sequence, the court held that the agency's
position could only be upheld if it was, in fact, compelled by the regu-
lations in effect prior to February 1, 1976. In order to determine
whether the agency's particular construction was compelled, the court
authorized discovery beyond the existing official record,2 and permit-
ted inquiry into the interpretations given the regulations at different
decision-making levels within FEA. The court reasoned that in order
to uphold the contention by DOE that the non-product cost last recov-
ery sequence was compelled, it had to determine whether FEA had
consistently adhered to a non-product cost last recovery sequence
rather than the "proportional" sequence used by Standard.22 The
court's examination of the contemporaneous written and oral state-
ments of FEA officials regarding the regulations revealed that even key
agency officials did not consider the non-product cost last recovery se-
quence to be compelled by the regulatory scheme.23 As a result, the
court upheld Standard's cost recovery method.
Other cases in which courts have resorted to contemporaneous
construction have involved similar administrative silence where neither
the regulations nor accompanying official agency clarifications ad-
dressed the issues in dispute. In Amoco Production Co. v. DOE,24 the
court was asked to construe certain DOE regulations concerning trans-
fers of natural gas liquid and natural gas liquid products between affili-
ated entities of various integrated petroleum refining companies. DOE
argued that the sales between the affiliated entities were not entitled to
"first sale" 25 status and the attendant pricing advantages under DOE
regulations, even though the regulatory language seemingly authorized
unnecessary to claim non-product costs to support the sales price. Since these costs were not used
and could not be banked, these costs were lost for purposes of price support. Under the propor-
tional method, a proportion of non-product cost could be claimed simultaneously with the product
costs. This would result in the utilization of a much higher percentage of non-product costs. Ac-
cordingly, fewer non-product costs would be lost as a result of the prohibition against banking
non-product costs.
20. A decision that the non-product cost last recovery sequence did not apply prior to Febru-
ary of 1976 would have permitted the companies to claim unrecouped costs in amounts which
could potentially offset any overpricing violations that had occurred during the period of petro-
leum price controls. Thus, the agency's position on this issue was dictated, in part, by concern for
maintaining the viability of the existing regulatory price controls structure.
21. The court noted that the necessity of going beyond the existing record was required be-
cause DOE officials had no official documents clarifying the agency's position. Id. at 1046.
22. 596 F.2d at 1052-55.
23. Id. at 1055.
24. No. 78-463 (D. Del. May 29, 1979).
25. For a definition of "first sale," see 10 C.F.R. § 212.162 (1981) which states: "'First sale'
[Vol. 17:448
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first sale treatment. DOE maintained that although the regulations
were silent on the question, the effective operation of the regulatory
scheme compelled a prohibition of such treatment.26 Faced with no
express regulatory authority upon which to base its decision, the court
authorized contemporaneous construction discovery to provide "assist-
ance in construing the regulation by looking to the statements and ac-
tions of the agency personnel who have had the responsibility of
implementing and enforcing the contested regulatory provisions."2 7 In
view of the parties' ongoing responsibility for day to day interpretation
of the regulations, the court considered their contemporaneous con-
struction significant in evaluating the validity of the agency's regulatory
interpretation.28
Similarly, in Phillos Petroleum Co. v. DOE,29 the court authorized
discovery of the contemporaneous construction given to the statutes
and regulations in question from DOE's conduct, statements, and di-
rectives." The substantive issue in this case involved the method for
computing recovery of the increased non-product cost required under
DOE regulations then in effect.3 As in Amoco Production Co., the reg-
ulations were ambiguous and, after expiration of their effective period,
DOE announced that the regulations required use of a recovery
method to which Phillips took exception. In light of the administrative
vacuum created by the absence of a publicly disclosed explanation of
DOE's position, the court considered evidence obtained through con-
temporaneous construction necessary to the establishment of the plain-
tiff's case.32
Contemporaneous construction discovery is also used to determine
the degree of deference owed to an agency's interpretation. In this con-
text, contemporaneous construction discovery is triggered by a conflict
means.. . the first transfer for value to a class of purchaser for which a fixed price per unit of
volume is determined." Id.
A determination that such transfers were "first sales" under DOE regulations permits a firm
to claim certain additional price increments in its computation of purchase and production costs
incurred in a particular month. The inclusion of these amounts would ultimately result in an
increase in the maximum lawful selling price charged to third party purchasers of controlled
products.
26. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. DOE, No. 78-463, slip op. at 3-4 (D. Del. May 29, 1979).
27. Id. at 4.
28. See id. at 4-6.
29. 449 F. Supp. 760 (D. Del.), ard sub non. Standard Oil Co. v. DOE, 596 F.2d 1029
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
30. See id. at 783-85.
31. See id. at 769-70.
32. Id. at 783. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
6
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between official agency pronouncements relative to the disputed inter-
pretation, rather than the absence of administrative clarification of the
regulation.
The standards for determining the degree of deference to which a
particular agency's interpretation is entitled were clearly set out in
Skidmore v. Swft.33 The Skidmore court faced the question of whether
"waiting" time constitutes "working" time for purposes of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act.34 The Administrator of the Act had stated that it
could, in an interpretation bulletin and informal rulings.35 The Court,
in affirming the Administrator's decision, stated that the degree of def-
erence to which a particular agency interpretation is entitled is depen-
dent "upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control."36 The first two factors, the thoroughness and validity un-
derlying the agency's position, can be ascertained by reference to the
agency's interpretations and articulated rationales. No contemporane-
ous construction discovery is needed to apply these two elements of the
Skidmore test. It is the application of the third element of the Skid-
more test, however, which may give rise to a factual inquiry necessitat-
ing contemporaneous construction discovery.
In applying the Skidmore test to the substantive issues in a case,
the court should sustain the agency's interpretation if it is a reasonable
construction of the regulatory requirements and is consistent with the
agency's earlier pronouncements.37 Most courts' interpretations of
33. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The Court considered that "the rulings, interpretations, and opin-
ions ofthe Administrator. . . , while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance." Id. at 140.
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
35. 323 U.S. at 138.
36. Id. at 140.
37. See National Distrib. Co. v. United States Treasury Dept., 626 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
In applying the Skidmore test in this case, the court commented,
In the circumstances of this case the Bureau's interpretation has little power to persuade.
Not only is it at odds with the language of the statute and with the legislative history, but
it is also at odds with the interpretation adopted by the Bureau's predecessor agency at
least as early as 1949 and maintained by the Bureau until 1974. Even in 1974 the Bureau
apparently engaged in no thorough consideration of the need for a change in interpreta-
tion, and provided no persuasive reason to believe that its change of heart accurately
reflects the intention of Congress.
Id. at 1019. See generally Eirhart v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 616 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1980);
Good Samaritan Hosp., Corvallis v. Mathews, 609 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1979); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 657 (D.D.C. 1978).
[Vol. 17:448
7
Fedman: Looking behind the Record--An Analysis of Contemporaneous Constru
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
1982] CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION DISCOVERY 455
"reasonableness" are generally very liberal. For example, in University
of Southern California v. Cost of Living Council,38 which involved the
application of Phase I of the Cost of Living Council's price "freeze" to
sales of tickets to college football games, the Council had issued certain
circulars as part of its enforcement program which were intended to
provide general guidelines for compliance with its price stabilization
regulations. In a number of the circulars, the agency interpreted the
term "transaction" in such a manner as to permit retroactive applica-
tion of price controls to ticket sales occuring before the promulgation of
the controls. In upholding the agency's position, the court noted that
the Executive Order 9 establishing the controls laid only the "barest
foundation" to key words such as "prices," "services," and "transac-
tion." The court reasoned that such a broad delegation of authority
was the result of the "great deference" afforded the agency administra-
tor, who knew "better than most the causes of inflation, the reasons for
the freeze, and the purpose and intent of the Executive Order."40 Simi-
larly, in Camp v. Pitts,4 the Supreme Court held that an administrative
record consisting entirely of two explanatory letters written by the
Comptroller of the Currency to an applicant for a new bank charter
was a sufficient basis for an agency determination so long as it con-
tained the determinative reasons for the decision.42
It is only upon a threshold showing "that different courses of con-
duct might reasonably have been perceived to be prescribed under the
regulations in dispute, [that] the consistency of the agency's interpreta-
tion with earlier and later pronouncements becomes a valid subject of
inquiry." 43 Contemporaneous construction discovery is sought under
these circumstances to demonstrate that the disputed agency interpreta-
38. 472 F.2d 1065 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973). See also
Power Reactor Develop. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961),
where the Court stated that administrative agencies were given great deference when the adminis-
trative practice at stake "involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged
with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and
smoothly while they are yet untried and new." (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
39. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. § 199 (1971).
40. 472 F.2d at 1068-69.
41. 411 U.S. 138 (1973). See also Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 450 F.2d
698, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In this case, the court reasoned that the materials prepared by agency
employees were "probably filtered and refined by the Commission, with the result that its ultimate
decision was something more than, or at least different from, the sum of its 'parts.'"
42. See 411 U.S. at 140-42.
43. Atlantic Richfield Co. [1980 Transfer Binder] ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) 82,521, at 85,073
(1980). See also Exxon Corp. v. DOE, 4 ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) 26,149 (N.D. Tex. June 8,
1979); Tenneco Oil Co. v. DOE, 4 ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) 26,156 (D. Del. July 6, 1979).
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tion is not entitled to judicial deference because it is inconsistent with
prior and subsequent agency pronouncements. The showing of such
facial ambiguity cannot be made, however, merely by presenting evi-
dence that members of the regulated industry interpreted the regulation
differently from the agency or that the industry's custom and usage va-
ried from the agency's position.' Moreover., the argument that any
showing of ambiguity in the application of regulatory language to par-
ticular facts justifies a factual inquiry as to the meaning of the regula-
tions in dispute has also been rejected.45
Whether an agency's current interpretation is consistent with its
prior interpretations is generally determined by reference to other offi-
cial sources and documents, such as "the relevant statute and its legisla-
tive history, related regulatory provisions taken as a whole, regulatory
preambles, the agency's decisional law, [and] interpretive rulings, or
interpretations issued pursuant to the agency's formal mechanism for
such actions. 46 Inconsistent positions in such documents, as well as
prior and subsequent positions of the agency, will generally create suffi-
cient interpretative ambiguity to justify contemporaneous construction
discovery.47
44. In Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161 (1945), the parties sought a
declaratory judgment concerning what constituted "working time" for purposes of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The plaintiff argued that custom and practice prevailing in the bituminous coal
industry included in the workday only time spent "face to face" with the seam of the mine. Id. at
162-63. The Court held, however, that time spent in underground travel was also to be included.
In rejecting the company's position, the Court stated that the basic purpose of the Act was to
achieve a uniform national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work engaged in by em-
ployers covered under the Act. The Court further noted that "[a]ny custom or contract falling
short of that basic policy" could not be used to deprive employees of their statutory rights. Id. at
167.
45. In 4dantic Richfield Co., the court noted that
[allmost no statute or regulation, however skillfully drafted, can be written with the kind
of foresight that would eliminate all disputes as to its meaning in all circumstances. To
subject agencies to the burden of contemporaneous construction discovery whenever the
regulations in dispute fail to compel a particular result can render the execution of the
agencies' statutorily mandated tasks a practical impossibility.
[1980 Transfer Binder] ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) 82,521, at 85,073.
46. Id. at 85,074 (citation and footnotes omitted).
47. Tenneco Oil Co. v. DOE, 475 F. Supp. 299 (D. Del. 1979), illustrates the conditions under
which a court will authorize contemporaneous construction discovery to evaluate the consistency
of a particular agency position. Tenneco presented affidavits from parties closely associated with
the application of the disputed regulations to demonstrate that the provisions were subject to
differing, reasonable interpretations, and that various DOE pronouncements suggested different
views of the meaning of the subject provision. Noting the continued uncertainty about the proper
meaning of certain essential regulatory terms, the court was persuaded that contemporaneous con-
struction would be relevant and necessary to the task of construing those terms. The judicially
authorized discovery request required the production of agency information concerning the con-
struction given to the regulations at the time of their issuance and subsequent to their application
by the agency. Id. at 316-18.
9
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The recently decided case of In re Department of Energy Stripper
Well Exemption Litigation 4 8 is perhaps the most comprehensive appli-
cation of this doctrine to date. The issue was whether injection wells
should be included in the computation of average daily production for
purposes of qualifying for "stripper well" exemptions.49 Under DOE
crude oil pricing regulations, any lease covering a well with an average
daily production of less than ten barrels per day qualified as a "stripper
well" lease. All crude oil produced from such a lease was exempt from
price control regulations and could be sold at unrestricted market
prices. 50 The inclusion of injection wells in the well count was signifi-
cant in that it substantially lowered the average daily production from
a lease, thereby qualifying many leases for the stripper well exemption.
The plaintiff oil companies argued that injection wells were properly
included in the well count.because they were an integral part of secon-
dary recovery operations used to produce additional crude oil from a
particular lease.51 DOE, however, argued that since no crude oil was
produced directly from injection wells they should be excluded from
average production computations. 52 The pertinent statutes and rulings
were vague, merely providing that all wells which resulted in the recov-
ery of crude oil should be included in the stripper well exemption. 3
In rejecting DOE's interpretation of the pertinent statutes and rul-
ings, the court noted that "[t]here raged within the agency a great de-
bate as to whether injection wells were within the statutory
exemption. 54 The court recited the testimony of various DOE em-
ployees and noted apparent conflicts in their expressed views. The
court concluded that the evidence showed no "consistent and uniform
application of the statute and regulation to exclude injection wells. 55
In support of this conclusion, the court noted instances of lower level
DOE employees advising certain oil producers to count injection wells
in their stripper computations. 6 The court noted that it made its deci-
sion as a result of inconsistent agency statements even though the rec-
ord before it had disclosed "that perhaps the bulk of the advice given
48. No. 378, slip op. (D. Kan., filed July 14, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 10-39 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1981).
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 21-24.
51. Id. at 34.
52. Id. at 42.
53. Id. at 24.
54. Id. at 27.
55. Id. at 28.
56. Id.
10
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by the agency was to the effect that injection wells should not be
counted."57
B. Appropriate Agency Spokesman
As a general rule, institutional decisions may only be explained by
those having the delegated authority to speak on behalf of the institu-
tion." If an agency does not state a rationale for its actions, officials to
whom Congress has delegated no "responsibility for elaborating and
enforcing statutory commands" 9 may not provide a rationale. More-
over, factual inquiries cannot extend to all constructions offered by
agency employees because not all of their opinions and advice "reflect
the position of the agency as a whole." 60
The basis of this limitation was discussed in SEC v. National Stu-
dent Marketing Corp. 6 The court denied the defendant's request to
compel the agency to provide internal agency documents reflecting the
views of individual agency employees. In justifying its refusal of the
defendant's request, the court stated:
The intent of a governmental agency, such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission, is a rather limited concept which
cannot be determined from a random search of documents
authored by agency staff or individual Commissioners. The
SEC consists of five appointed Commissioners who are as-
sisted by staff members. While Commissioners may in fact
respect the staff's recommendations, they are not bound by
them nor do such recommendations necessarily reflect the po-
sition of the agency itself on any given topic. Similarly, the
views of an individual Commissioner will not invariably re-
flect the position of the agency as a whole. The great bulk of
57. Id. at 31.
58. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbeit, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 827 (1971); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157 (D.D.C. 1975), af'd, 538
F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. deniedsub nom. White & Case v. SEC, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977). In
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962), the court stated that
"[tlhe courts may not accept appellate counsel'spost hoc rationalizations for agency action ....
For the courts to substitute their or counsel's discretion for that of the Commission is incompatible
with the orderly functioning of the process of judicial review."
59. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971).
60. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157, 160 (D.D.C. 1975). See also Ster-
ling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Sterling, the court reasoned that the
material prepared by agency employees "was probably filtered and refined by the Commission,
with the result that its ultimate decision was something more than, or at least different from, the
sum of its 'parts."' Id. at 706.
61. 68 F.R.D. 157 (D.D.C. 1975).
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the documents requested by the defendants are not "Commis-
sion-authored" but rather, they consist, with few exceptions,
of memoranda among individual Commissioners, their legal
assistants, and the Commission staff. Therefore, they are of
little, if any value, and cannot be considered as an official ex-
pression of the will and the intent of the Commission.6 2
In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. ,63 the defendant relied on
constructions given the firm by various lower level agency employees of
the Office of Price Administration (OPA) as authorization for its ac-
tions. In determining that such constructions were not binding on the
agency, the Court stated that "[o]ur only tools, therefore, are the plain
words of the regulation and any relevant interpretations of the Admin-
istrator."" In designating which agency documents represented rele-
vant interpretations, the Court identified three sources: (1) a bulletin
published by the Admingtrator; (2) the Administrator's quarterly re-
port to Congress; and (3) published interpretations.6" As published,
circulated materials expressing the Administrator's interpretation, these
documents represented the ultimate criteria in resolving questions of
construction and were of controlling weight unless "plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation. ' 66
There is a general prohibition against determining the meaning of
a regulation by apost hoc inquiry into the mental processes of the deci-
sion making group.6 The purpose of such a prohibition is to preserve
the free and uninhibited flow of frank assessments from lower level
officials performing analysis and making recommendations to the deci-
sion maker.68
There are, however, certain recognized conditions under which the
views of lower level agency officials are considered within the scope of
62. Id. at 160.
63. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
64. Id. at 414.
65. Id. at 417-18.
66. Id. at 414. See also International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349, 1358 (2d Cir.), cer.
denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157 (D.D.C. 1975).
67. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941); Renegotiation Bd. Corp. v. Grumman
Aircraft Eng. Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975).
68. Although probing the mental processes of an administrative decision maker is not consid-
ered an appropriate function of the court, such inquiries may be warranted where a showing of
bad faith or improper conduct has been made. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971). In Overton Park, the Court indicated that where administrators had ex-
plained their decisions with contemporaneous findings or memoranda supporting the decision, an
inquiry would be permitted only on a showing of bad faith or improper conduct. If such findings
were unavailable, however, the Court indicated that examination of the decision makers them-
selves might be necessary for effective judicial review. Id. at 420.
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contemporaneous construction discovery. The interpretations of a
lower level official may be entitled to deference if they received the
sanction of the Administrator as an official interpretation.69 Such a po-
sition is consistent with the inclusion in administrative records of docu-
ments written by lower level officials that are ultimately adopted as the
agency's position.7 °
In addition, where the language of a regulation is inherently in-
consistent with the agency's interpretation of its regulatory scheme,
courts, in an attempt to resolve this conffict, have looked to the state-
ments and actions of those agency employees vested with the responsi-
bility of enforcing the contested regulatory provisions. For example, in
Standard Oil Co. v. DOE,7 1 the court, in determining the weight to be
given DOE's regulatory interpretation, authorized discovery of state-
ments of auditors and other enforcement personnel which were incon-
sistent with DOE's interpretation.72 The court considered the
statements of these lower level employees valuable because of their
technical expertise, their exposure to industry practice, and their
responsiblity to interpret the contested regulations in the course of day
to day enforcement. In Amoco Production Co. v. DOE,73 the court re-
lied on similar considerations in examining the views of agency person-
nel who had participated in the development of the disputed
regulations. The court reasoned that the expertise and knowledge of
such individuals made their interpretations of the regulatory language
during the developmental stages of the regulation of "substantial value
in resolving the construction question in much the same way that Con-
gressional committee proceedings are of value in determining legisla-
tive intent.' 74 The Standard and Amoco cases should not be viewed,
however, as departures from the doctrine which limits discovery only to
statements of personnel authorized to speak for the agency. The courts
in each case noted that an administrative vacuum existed due to a com-
plete absence of official agency pronouncements clarifying the disputed
regulations.7 Both courts authorized inquiries into the interpretation
69. See National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Gov. of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241-
42 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
70. Southern Goods Corp. v. Bowles, 158 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1946).
71. 596 F.2d 1029 (remp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). See also California Molasses Co. v. Califor-
nia Hawaiian Sugar Co., 551 F.2d 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Petrolane Inc. v. DOE, 79 F.R.D. 115
(C.D. Cal. 1978).
72. 596 F.2d at 1056.
73. No. 78-463, slip op. (D. Del. May 29, 1979).
74. Id. at 5.
75. 596 F.2d at 1056.
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of lower level officials as a last resort in attempting to discern the
agency's position.
Other recent cases, however, have authorized inquiries into the
statements of lower level officials without the administrative vacuum
that existed in the Standard and Amoco cases.76 In Gf Oil Corp. v.
Schlesinger,77 the court, relying on Citizens to Preserve Over/on Park v.
Volpe,78 ordered the deposing of former agency officials concerning
their understanding of a regulatory term in the absence of a contempo-
raneous administrative record, even though the agency had subse-
quently issued an official interpretation of the provision. In reasoning
characteristic of these cases expanding the use of contemporaneous
construction discovery, the court concluded that the privilege tradition-
ally given agency decision makers was outweighed by the need for the
information sought. 9 Moreover, without such information, there
would have been no basis upon which to evaluate the validity of the
plaintiff's case.
In PhillOs Petroleum Co. v. DOE,80 the court upheld discovery re-
quests for various statements and internal memoranda prepared by
DOE auditors regarding the statute and regulations in dispute. In en-
tering its order, the court, despite the existence of a pertinent regulatory
amendment and an accompanying preamble, noted the inadequacy of
the administrative record and the need for additional clarification of
the agency's position in order to guide construction of the statute. 1
A similar case, Exxon Corp. v. DOE,82 involved a dispute concern-
ing the definition of the term "transaction"' 3 as it pertained to the pric-
ing of crude oil under DOE regulations. In its determination of pricing
violations DOE excluded certain sales which were made under "varia-
76. See California Molasses Co. v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 551 F.2d 1230 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1977); Exxon Corp. v. DOE, 4 ENERGY MGMT (CCH) 26,149 (N.D. Tex. 1979);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Tenneco Oil Co. v. DOE, 4
ENERGY MGMT (CCH) 26,156 (D. Del. 1979); Petrolane Inc. v. DOE, 79 F.R.D. 115 (C.D. Cal.
1978); Getty Oil Co. v. DOE, 1 ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) 9741 (D. Del. 1978); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. FEA, 1 ENERGY MGMT (CCH) 19739 (D. Del. 1977).
77. 465 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
78. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
79. 465 F. Supp. at 916.
80. 449 F. Supp. 760 (D. Del 1978).
81. Id. at 784.
82. 4 ENERGY MGMT (CCH) 26,149 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
83. "Transaction" is defined in 10 C.F.R. § 212.31 (1981) as "an arms-length sale between
unrelated persons ... considered to occur at the time and place when a binding contract is en-
tered into between parties."
14
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ble price"84 contracts. As a result of their exclusion, the maximum law-
ful price which Exxon could charge third party purchasers was
reduced. In excluding these contracts, DOE relied upon Ruling 1977-
5,85 issued by it after the promulgation of price control regulations.
DOE argued that its interpretation of "transaction" was entitled to
great deference, and that its ruling should be sustained as a rational
interpretation of its regulation. 6 In contrast, Exxon contended that the
language of the regulation included variable price contracts and that
prior to the issuance of the ruling even DOE auditors had interpreted it
in such a manner.87 In holding for the company, the court stated that
the meaning of the regulation was not ambiguous and that DOE's in-
terpretation of the term was not due any deference because it was pa-
tently inconsistent with the regulation. 8 Moreover, the court noted
that statements of DOE auditors showed that prior to the issuance of
the ruling DOE had interpreted the regulation in the same manner as
Exxon. The court concluded that the depositions and affidavits of
DOE auditors and other lower officials were entitled to consideration
in determining the consistency of earlier and later agency pronounce-
ments.8 9 After all, these exhibits clearly indicated that officials in re-
sponsible positions within the agency consistently advised the plaintiff
and the agency's own auditors that variable price contracts were in-
cluded in the "transaction" definition. 90
In Tenneco Oil Co. v. DOE,9 1 there was an allegation that the
terms "inequity" and "gross inequity", as they were used in connection
with DOE exception procedures,92 were ambiguous and subject to mul-
tiple interpretations. In light of the relevance and necessity of Ten-
neco's request for contemporaneous construction discovery, the court
held that discovery need not be limited to the statements made to the
public but was also to include internal memoranda, directives, and
84. A variable price contract "prescrib[es] a specific unit price that may fluctuate over the
duration of the contract based on changes in a specified reference price or other objective stan-
dard." 4 ENERGY MGMT (CCH) 126,149, at 27,317 n.4.
85. 42 Fed. Reg. 15,302 (1977).
86. 4 ENERGY MGmT (CCH) 126,149, at 27,318.
87. Id. at 27,319.
88. Id. at 27,318-19.
89. Id. at 27,319.
90. Id.
91. 475 F. Supp. 299 (D. DeL 1979).
92. The statutory procedure for obtaining exception relief under DOE regulations is at 10
C.F.R. §§ 205.50-.69E (1981) (exception relief is generally granted where the application of the
regulation results in extreme hardship or gross inequity).
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guidelines generated at various levels within the agency. 93 Similarly, in
Dorchester Gas Producing Co. v. DOE, 94 the court used contemporane-
ous construction discovery to consider statements of lower level agency
employees prior to ruling on the legal issues in the case, 95 and in Getty
Oil Co. v. DOE,9 6 the court ruled that lower level contemporaneous
constructions were discoverable, although it declined to hold that such
evidence was essential to deciding the case. 97
To the extent that these cases authorize discovery of contempora-
neous constructions when regulations are alleged to be ambiguous, they
are departures from the prevailing view on this issue. This departure
appears to be based on a new assessment of the proper balance between
the need for essential evidence and the erosion of the agency's eviden-
tiary privileges." In the absence of other available guidance concern-
ing the meaning of an ambiguous regulation, courts increasingly are
authorizing the construction of an administrative record based on the
statements of lower level agency personnel responsible for applying the
disputed regulations. Courts view the relevancy and importance of this
information as outweighing the burden placed upon the agency in pro-
viding it.
C. Scope of Contemporaneous Construction Discovery Evidence
In defining the scope of extrinsic evidence necessary to discern the
intent and meaning of a disputed regulation, courts generally have lim-
ited contemporaneous construction discovery to two areas: rulemaking
history materials, and official and unofficial agency interpretations.99
Rulemaking history materials consist of source documents relied on by
decision makers in formulating the agency's position." ° The courts'
assessment of the validity of the reasoning expressed in these docu-
ments has a substantial bearing on the deference given to the regulation
93. 475 F. Supp. at 318. See Robins & Weill, Inc. v. United States, 63 F.R.D. 73, 76-77
(M.D.N.C. 1974). The District Court ordered the Internal Revenue Service to make available to
the plaintiffinternal "instructions to staff, and general policy statements or interpretations adopted
by the I.R.S. affecting members of the public on the specific issue of depreciation involved
herein."
94. No. CA-3-75-0836-W, slip op. (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 1978)
95. Id. at 3.
96. 1 ENERGY MGMT (CCH) 9741 (D. DeL 1978).
97. Id. at 9893.
98. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, the court stated that in deciding whether a protective
order is warranted, the court must determine whether the privilege is outweighed by the need for
the information sought by the moving party. 465 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
99. See, e.g., Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
100. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT §§ 5.01-.06 at 123-38 (3d ed. 1972).
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in dispute. Such materials are analogous to legislative history and are
designed to aid the court in deciding questions of law.101
Discovery of internal predecisional deliberations generally is con-
sidered irrelevant for purposes of contemporaneous construction dis-
covery. There is a substantial body of law which supports the general
proposition that "[t]he analysis and recommendations of agency staff
members need not be divulged to the parties in proceedings before the
agency itself."02 Exceptions to the rule apply only where the agency
explicitly has adopted an internal memorandum as the basis of its deci-
sion or where the memorandum contains purely factual material which
should be part of the administrative record.1 3 In addition, a substan-
tial body of case law does not consider draft documents relevant sub-
jects for discovery."w
The principle of nondisclosure of internal memoranda has been
elevated by public policy to a generally recognized evidentiary privi-
lege. In determining whether a privilege exists, the courts generally
have applied two standards. The first is the facts-opinions dichotomy
which does not extend any privilege to factual information.105 The sec-
ond is a predecisional/post-decisional distinction. Under this test,
agency memoranda, prepared during the deliberative process preceding
the issuance of a formal agency pronouncement, are considered
predecisional and are privileged from disclosure. Post-decisional infor-
mation, however, whether in written or testimonial form, generally is
not privileged. This distinction is based on the assumption that docu-
ments which contain internal recommendations and advice submitted
for consideration in the performance of decision- and policy-making
functions must be protected from disclosure, so that the agency's final
position will reflect a full and frank exchange of opinions which would
be impossible if all internal communications were made public.106
101. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 60 at 161-65 (1976).
102. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1242
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). Accord, Action for Children's Telev. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458,
477 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 67-71 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See
Rodway v. United States Dep't. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975); National Nutri.
Foods Ass'n v. Matthews, 418 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
103. See Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973); 516 F.2d at 1242.
104. See Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944); Helvering v. New York Trust
Co., 292 U.S. 455 (1934); Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973).
105. See Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339-40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896
(1963).
106. See NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-54 (1974); Bristol-Meyers Co. v.
FTC, 598 F.2d 18, 22-25 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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This privilege was applied by the court in Getty Oil Co. v. DOE.10 7
Getty challenged a Notice of Probable Violation and Remedial Order
issued by DOE, alleging that the Notice and Order were not supported
by substantial evidence, and that apparently the enforcement docu-
ments were issued erroneously for the purpose of discriminating
against Getty. 10 Getty sought, through discovery, a number of inter-
nal policy recommendations and advisory opinions. The court held
that Getty could compel production of the documents only if the ad-
ministrative record presented by the agency was insufficient to explain
the decision, and a strong showing of bad faith or improper conduct
was made. 10 9 In limiting the scope of Getty's discovery request, the
court noted that the material sought by Getty was not a reflection of
any official policy nor part of any administrative record. The court
went on to hold that the administrative record adequately explained
the basis for the agency's decision, and that the agency's discriminatory
actions did not constitute bad faith or improper conduct. 110 Absent
these two conditions, the court ruled that the company's need for the
information did not outweigh the need to preserve the integrity of the
administrative decision-making process."'
In construing regulations, courts also rely on interpretations of
regulations issued by the agency having expertise in the area. Materials
in this category include rulings, interpretations, final enforcement doc-
uments, and exception decisions. Such documents are generally mat-
ters of public record and therefore contemporaneous construction
discovery is not necessary. This category also generally would include
enforcement materials and instructions, as well as directions of general
applicability, issued by appropriate agency management personnel
through the agency's formal mechanism for issuing such documents."12
Courts are generally very reluctant to rely upon the regulatory in-
terpretations in written documents, notes, and letters of individual
agency employees. As the court stated in Marine Engineers' Beneficial
Association No. 13 v. NLRB:113
107. 1 ENERGY MGMT (CCH) 9741 (D. Del. 1978).
108. See id. at 9890-9 1.
109. See id. at 9892-93.
110. Id. at 9894.
111. Id. at 9893.
112. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), where the Court relied on
agency (EEOC) opinion letters interpreting a statute at the time of its enactment in declining to
follow a later conflicting EEOC guideline. Id. at 142-43.
113. 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
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The interpretation of its enabling act by an administra-
tive body is, of course, important as bearing upon the effect of
a statute, but interpretation given by an individual member of
a Board or by its attorney is not, we think, to be taken as that
official kind of interpretation to which courts must pay
attention.' 14
Recent cases reveal a more liberal view by the courts about evi-
dentiary materials are appropriate subjects for contemporaneous con-
struction discovery. In Standard Oil Co. v. DOE,"' the court
authorized discovery concerning not only opinions and directives in
operation manuals, but also explicit indicators of agency actions, such
as the practice of auditors and the reactions of administrators having
knowledge of industry practice in applying the regulations. The court
relied on internal DOE memoranda issued to field auditors in uphold-
ing a pre-enforcement challenge of a regulation governing the sequence
of recovery of certain costs computed under DOE regulations.
In Amoco Production Co. v. DOE,"I6 the court adopted a similar
view in ordering discovery of "evidence reflecting the views of agency
personnel who . . . participated in the development of the disputed
regulation."' 17 The court also concluded, however, that plaintiff's dis-
covery request went too far, and held that DOE was not required to
provide the plaintiffs with administrative records of interpretive rules
or contemporaneous DOE documents that were generated more than
four years after the contested regulation.""
In Petrolane, Inc. v. DOEII and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. DOE,120
two different United States District Courts authorized the taking of
depositions of lower level DOE officials concerning their interpreta-
tions of contested regulations. The courts in these cases determined
114. Id. at 550.
115. 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). The court concluded "that the statements
by FEA auditors and other lower level officials are entitled to weight in determining the thorough-
ness of the FEA's consideration of its regulations, the validity of its reasoning, and its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements." Id. at 1056.
116. No. 78-463, slip op. (D. Del. May 29, 1979).
117. Id. at 5. In this case the court entered an order granting a discovery motion because of
the expertise and knowledge involved in the opinions of those agency personnel. For a discussion
of evidentiary privilege in the administrative context, see Comment, D&covery in Litigation Wii
Federal Agencies-Seeking Information In The Challenge Of Interpretative Rules, 28 U. KAN. L.
REv. 487, 492-502 (1980).
118. Amoco Prod. Co. v. DOE, No. 78-463, at 8.
119. 79 F.R.D. 115 (C.D. CaL 1978).
120. 449 F. Supp. 760 (D. Del.), af'd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. DOE, 596 F.2d 1029
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
[Vol. 17:448
19
Fedman: Looking behind the Record--An Analysis of Contemporaneous Constru
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
1982] CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION DISCOVERY 467
such testimony to be appropriate where the existing administrative rec-
ord did not address the specific question in controversy and a showing
of facial ambiguity had been made. 121
III. CONCLUSION
Although they have recognized contemporaneous construction dis-
covery as a useful interpretive guide, courts have been hesitant to ex-
tend such discovery beyond statements made by supervisory employees
of agencies. Executive privilege and the general prohibition against
probing the mind of the administrative decision maker often have lim-
ited the application of the doctrine to inquiries concerning the practical
constructions given disputed regulations by supervisory officials at or
near the time of promulgation.
Recent developments, however, signal a broadening of this discov-
ery procedure. Faced with ambiguous regulations and no official clari-
fication, courts, in a number of recent decisions, have authorized the
examination of interpretations given the regulation by lower level en-
forcement personnel in the course of their duties. This expansion has
been justified primarily by the absence of an official pronouncement,
and the relevance of the evidence in determining the deference due a
particular agency interpretation.
A probable result of this development will be closer scrutiny by
agency officials of informal agency processes for dispensing informa-
tion, both within the agency and to regulated parties. The adverse im-
pact on administrative litigation resulting from interpretive
contradictions among agency officials and enforcement personnel will
likely result in a curtailment of the informal explanations of agency
positions given in the course of day to day enforcement. Such a pros-
pect also will encourage agency officials to utilize formal administrative
interpretive and rulemaking procedures to clarify an agency's position,
thereby reducing the chance of having these positions scrutinized later
through contemporaneous discovery.
This development of contemporaneous construction discovery of-
fers opportunities to parties facing agency enforcement actions. The
disclosure of intra-agency inconsistencies may prove to be a valuable
121. 79 F.R.D. at 121; 449 F. Supp. at 784. The court in Phillips Petroleum Co. stated that it
would not "discount the importance of statements of the FEA's auditors and compliance officials
simply because they were not authorized to issue formal interpretations of the agency's regula-
tions." Id. at 784.
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means of discrediting an agency's position and thereby reducing the
advantages of the courts' general deference to agency interpretations.
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